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7188 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
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LIMITE·D, a corporation, 
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corporation, 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAWAIIAN EQUIPMENT C·O;M·PANY, 
LIMITED, a corporation, 
Plaiwt'iff and Res~p~ondernt, 
vs. 
THE EIMCO CO·RPORATI~)N, a 
corporation, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7188 
By their brief, counsel for respondent, in effect, con-
cede the insufficiency of the cablegrams (Exhibits A and 
B) standing alone to constitute a written contract, but 
they argue that· the deficiencies are supplied by the, oral 
conversations 'between the parties prior to the sending of 
said ·cablegrams. In .other words, they contend that not-
withstanding Exhibit A, ''the memori(J;ndum in w·riVing 
of the conbract" signed "by the p~arty vo be charged" 
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m·erely says:·'' Reference hammers,'' respondent had the 
right to show by parol what hammers and of what makes 
and how many of eaeh make EIMCO meant, that is, that 
it meant: 
"Scaling Hammers 
418 Model K-1 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
1250 Model F·C Chicago Pneumatic ·Tool ·Co. 
140 Model MM Independent Pneumatic 'Tool Co. 
4 Model ''Super'' Keller Co. 
1 Model A Dallet Co. 
1813 Total 
·Chipping Hammers 
708 M·odel No. 2 Master Pneumatic Tool Co. 
188 Model No. 2 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
92 Model No. 200 Ingersoll Rand Co. 
22 Model No. 2 Keller Co. 
1004 Total" 
The foregoing is a particular description of the prop-
erty respondent alleges in its complaint that appellant 
by Exhibit A agreed to buy. If counsel's contention is 
correct, then the lack of description in the '' men1oran-
dum" is immate·rial and the authorities which hold that. 
the ''m·emorandum'' must contain all th·e terms of the 
contract, including a designation and descrip,tion of the 
property which is the subject of the transaction, are to 
be dis~egarded. 
The cas·es cited by counsel do not sustain their con-
tention that such deficiencies in the '~ memorandun1 '' 
may be supplied by parol. They merely hold that in son1e 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
circumstances, parol evidence is admissible to apply a 
definibe description ·in ·a memoriandum to particular prop-
erty. Let us examine the authorities counsel ·cite at pages 
15-16 of their brief. 
In Bartlett-Heard and Cat,tle Company v. Harris, 
238 Pac. 327, the offer to sell described the pro1p,erty as 
''all the heifers you inspected.'' This language definitely 
specified the property. Parol evidence did not add to the 
contract, but only applied the designation to the particu-
lar property which had theretofore been identified. 
In NortheasfAern Paper Compwny v. Q,oncord P·ape.r 
C·o., 212 N.Y.S. 218, the description was "all pap·er rolls 
stored in seller's warehouse.'' H·ere the property is 
definitely described. 'The description could necessarily 
mean only certain specific property. 
In Zimmerman Bros. and C·ompany vs. First Na-
tional B·ank, 263 N. W. 3'61, the des-cription was "Park 
Ridge Safety Deposit Boxes.'' This could mean only 
certain specified boxes. It limits and restricts the desig-
nation to particular property. 
The principal announced in these cases is thus stated 
in 27 C.J. 383: 
''Parol evidence is admis~;ible for the purpose 
of applying the description in 'the 1nem·orandum 
and thus identifying the subject matter of the 
contract provided such subject matter is so de-
scribed in. the n1en1orandum as to be capable of 
certain id~n tifica tion ; but parol evidence is not 
admissible- to. supply a description of the subject 
rna tter_.'' (Italics. ours) 
This court has itself applied that rule. In Easton v. 
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Thatcher, 7 Uta~h 99, the memorandum was as follows: 
''Received of J. M. Easton the sum of $10.00 
·as ·an· option on one..: half interest of Hyrum 
Thatcher of Logan City in horses and ranch ·etc.'' 
Says the ·court: 
''This is equivalent 'to saying 'a ranch in 
·which Hyrum Thatcher owns a one-half interest.' 
Extrinsic evidence to show that Hyrum Thatcher 
owned a one-half interest in a ranch would be 
competent, and it would also he competent for 
witnesses familiar with the ranch 'to des·cribe it, 
giving its boundaries. By such evidenee the con-
tra·ct could be app,lied to the subject matter, and if 
the existence of such a ranch was to be so shown, 
in the absence of any proof of another ranch in 
whi~h Hyrum Thatcher owned a one-half interest, 
the subject matter of the contract would be identi-
fied and it would not 'be within the. statute of 
frauds. I't would also be competent to prove that 
Hyrum Thatcher owned a one-half interest in no 
other ranch.'' 
This court approved the foregoingrule in Cummings 
v. Niels~on, 42 Utah 157, 168, 129 Pac. 619, and in Johns,on 
v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 ·Pac. 893. 
But the case at bar is certainly not within that rule. 
What is there in the words ''Reference hammers bid 
maximum 24 dollars each, scalers 17.50 ·each Honolulu. 
Will take all," so that oral testimony could apply this 
language to any certain property and especially to the 
particular· list of 1jroperty set forth in the co1nplain t? 
Exhibit A does not describe any particular . property, 
either by models, makes, quantity or location, so as to 
make it capable· of:· certain identification ·as none other 
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than the particular p·roperty listed in the complaint and 
as the property appellant understood to be the 
su'bject matter of the contract. If all these omis-
sions can be supplied by parol, then the rule that 
the memorandum signed by the party to be charged 
shall contain all the terms of the agreement and 
a reasonably definite description of the property means 
nothing. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Blades, 
whom respondent regarded as the man who knew most 
about the merchandis·e, says that he saw only samples of 
the property and did not know how many of any differ-
ent make tools were contained in the crates until they 
had been moved to and opened at the Salt Lake ar·ea in 
Honolulu in the latter part of August. (Rec. pp. 206-207). 
How can it be said that the words "Reference hammers" 
meant the particular ·property listed in the complaint 
when the respondent itself did not know of what. the 
property consisted until long after the exchange of cable-
grains 1 There was no possibility that the words ''Refer-
ence hammers" could mean that par~icular p·'r!operty. 
The fact that Exhibit A contains the. words ''Will take 
all" does not help to identify the property. All of what? 
All the government had for sale 1 All respondent de·-
cided to buy fro1n the government? All that res·pondent 
should de~ide to deliver to appellant? ·The words have 
no definite meaning as applied to any particul~-r prop~­
erty. Under the universally accepted rule, the "memoran-
dum" must be definite in its terms and conditions and 
the property muet be so described that it cannot be one 
thing or another. Descriptions such as "the forty acre 
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tract of John Davis'' might be shown to be a forty in 
Section 36, hut if the evidence showed that he owned 
more than one forty, the memorandum would have to be 
rejected. The property might be described as ''all the 
sacks of sugar in the warehouse of '' B '' or ''all the flour 
inspected by you'' or by any other phraseology that 
would necessarily limit the identification so that only 
certain property could possibly be covered by the writ-
ing. In any su·ch case, parol is permissible to apply the 
'vords to ·su0h ·particular property, but ''Reference ham-
Iners'' does not identify any particular group, kind, 
model, or make of hammers, or where located, or the 
quantity thereof. Certainly those words do not identify 
the part£cular numbers, models, makes or ki·nds ·of ham-
mers respon~dent alleges in its comp·laint. that appellant 
agreed" irn writing" to buy. 
As stated in our quotation from Corpus Juris, parol 
evidence is not permissible to ·supply a description. The 
true rule 'is well stated by the Supren1e Court ·of Michigan 
in Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610, 618: 
.'' 'A further o'bjection is that the proposal 
did not sufficiently describe the real estate to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The general prin-
ciple is not questioned. The degree of certainty 
with which the .premises must be denoted is de-
. fined in many books, and the cases are extre1nely 
numerous in which the subject has· be·en illustrated. 
T'hey are not all harmonious. Bu't. they agree in 
this, that it is not essential that the description 
have such particulars and tokens of identifiC'ation 
as to render a .reso:rt to extrinsic aid ·entirely need-
less when the writing· comes to he applied to the 
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subject matter. The tern1s may be abstract and of 
a general nature, but they Inust be sufficien't to fit 
and con1prehend the p·ropert~T which is the subject 
of the transaction; so that W'ith the assistance of 
external evidence, the description, without being 
contradicted or added to, can be connected with 
and applied to the very property intended and 
to the exclusion of all other property'.'' 
"\V. e invite the court at this point to again refer to 
the cases cited on pages 11 to 20 of our first brief as to 
what must be embodied in the ''memorandum'' .. Here, 
accordJ.ing to tlz e complaint the goods were sold by spe-
cific description, so many of each make and model, so 
this is particularly a case 'vhere the specific description 
of the property or some language definitely designating 
it by location or other means of identification, should 
have appeared in the ''memorandum.'' 
At page 7 of our brief, we cited the case of N~ation4l 
Bank -of Commerce v. Lambourne, et ·al, 2 Fed. (2d) 23, 
in support of the recognized principle that in construing 
comn1ercial contracts, every word must be given effect, 
and that, therefore, the words, ''bid maximum'-', in Ex-
hibit A are not to be disregarded or interpreted as an 
"offer to buy", when such an interpretation is different 
from what those words imply. Counsel for appellant 
(Br. p. 9) assert that in the reversal of this case by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the principle for 
which we contend was repudiated. Such is not ·the case. 
The majority. opinion merely distinguishes the Lam-
bourne case from Filley v. Pope, 115 u .. s .. 213, 29 I.1. Ed. 
372, wherein the court clearly recognizes the principle 
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to he applied in the construction of commercial contracts. 
Indeed, in the majority opinion in the Lambourne case, 
it is said: 
''As was said in Harrison v. Fortlage, 116 
U. S. 57, 63, 16 S. Ct. 488, 489, 40 L. Ed. 616: 
'' 'The court is no't at liberty either to disre-
gard words used by the parties descriptive of the 
subj·ect matter or ·of any material in-cident or to 
insert words "rhich the parties have not made use 
of'." 
Moreover, ·Chief Justice Stone in a dissenting opin-
ion in the Lambourne case says that all of the members 
of the Supreme Court were in agreement upon the prin-
cipal to which we ref.er. Chief Justice Stone says at the 
end of his dissent, concurred in by three other justices: 
''The provision in the letter of credit that 
conditions embodied in this credit must be ad-
hered to, otherwise payment will not be effected, 
only exp!ress·es the rule with which we all agree 
that liability upon a mercantile contract 1nay be 
established only by strict compliance 'vith its con-
ditions." (Citing Filley v. Pope and other cases) .. 
In answer to appellant's contention that there was 
no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract, because 
appellant by Exhibit A n1eant one thing, that is, an 
authorization to bid, while respondent claims it regarded 
said exhibit as an offer to buy, counsel. for respondent 
urge that when. Exhibits A and B are considered ''in 
the light of the circun1stances under which they were 
made," (App. Br. p. 25) and "in the light of their (the 
partie-s') knowledge and the attendant circumstances," 
(App. Br. 31) a me-eting of minds is disclosed, and eoun-
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sel quote exeerpts from the testimony of MacNaughton 
as to what were the "attendant cireun1stances." 
.... \g-ain a.t page ·7 of its brief, respondent states: 
''The und i-s pu,ted evidence showing the situa-
tion of the parties and surrounding circumstances 
taken together 'vith the exchange of cables (Ex. 
A. & B.) establish that Ein1co agreed to purchase 
from Haw··aiian Equip1nent Company the en't.ire 
quantity of certain pneumatic tools, etc." (Italics 
ours). 
·The record ""ill disclos·e that .llfr. Rosenblatt con-
troverts the statements of MacNaughton as to the "sur-
rounding circumstances'' and as to what was said in the 
telephone conversations and the evidence is not undis-
puted that "Ein1co agreed to purchase'' etc. Rosenblatt 
iet;tified positively that he made no proposal to buy and 
that respondent did not offer appellant anything. ( Rec. 
p. 242). The "surrounding circumstances" as stated by 
~lacN aught on is only his version, which is no more 
'"·or!hy of acceptance than ~Ir. Rosenblatt's. Further-
more, respondent insisted at the trial that the two cables 
constituted the contract that ''cannot be modified by 
previous parol conversations,'' ( Rec. pp. 236, 254, 259) 
and that any testin1ony with respect to the relations 
between Rosenblatt and Winehei"g for the purp·ose of 
~bowing an agency and that, therefore, Exhibit A was 
Inerely an authorization to bid \Yas not admissible. (Rec. 
p. 2.)4). This objection was by the court sustained. Now, 
however, in order to make it appear that a contract was 
entered into, counsel \Yant this court to accept oral state-
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ments made prior to -the cablegrams (that is, respon-
dent's version of those conversations) to supplement the 
cables as to description of property and terms of the 
contract and to interpret the words "bid maximum" as 
meaning" offer to buy." 
At page 8 of their brief, counsel assert: 
"'The minutest search of the record will fail 
to reveal that there was any serious effort to pre-
sent, during 'the trial of this cause, any such issue 
to the ·effect that while defendant denies it n1ade 
a contract to purchase from plaintiff, still it ad-
mits making a contract appointing plaintiff i'ts 
agent to acquire these goods from the govern-
ment." 
It is to be regretted that counsel. will make such a 
misstatement. ·T·he fact is, as disclosed by the record, 
that appellant made several offers to prove by Rosenb~ 
and by Wineberg that appellant intended by Exhibit A 
to appoint respondent agent to make a bid to the gov-
ernment" of the maximum figures stated in Exhibit A 
(Rec~ pp. 236, 253, 254, 259, 27 4). 
Again counsel at the same page of the brief states: 
· '' Eimco had made a proposal through de-
fendant's San Francisco office to buy fron1 plain-
tiff.'' 
This statement is likewise disputed by Rosenb&l~r 
(R:ec. p~ 242); and even if the staten1ent · w:ere true, it 
could not aid respondent when the validity of the writ-
ten contract, which it alleges in its complaint, depends 
upon the contents of· the two· cablegrarns, which during 
the trial,· counsel for respondent repeatedly contended 
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could not be modified, supplen1ented or changed by parol. 
K ow, as to Exhibit B. Respondent has a difficult 
time indeed trying to establish that Exhibit B was an 
unoonditional -acceptance. How can it be said that in an 
absolute sale to appellant (if there was a sale, which we 
deny) it \vas in1plied that appellant by Exhibit A offered 
to buy only on condition that respondent could secure 
delivery from surplus~ Th·ere is no suggestion in Ex-
hibit . .~.:\. that the offer (if there was an offer to buy, 
\vhich \Ye deny) \tvas conditional upon the delivery of 
1nerchandise to respondent. Respondent accepted the 
offer (if it was an offer) upon that condition because 
it wanted to play safe. When it no\v realizes the legal 
effect of the wording of Exhibit B, it says that a~ppellant 
was bound if respondent did secure delivery, but re-
spondent would not have been bound if it had not. The 
language, "in accordance with your cable, Hawaiian 
Equipment Company sells you subject to delivery from 
s?.trplus", is so obviously outside of any ·suggestion in 
the Hoffer'' (Exhibit A) that it could not possibly give 
rise to a contract. 
Respondent n1ay have intended that it should be 
bound only if it could obtain delivery from surplus, and 
it clearly expressed that state of mind and intention in 
,, 'Exhibit B"; but appellant gave no indication in Exhibit 
A that it was doing business on that basis and respon-
dent cannot base its right to recovery on a so-called 
in1plierl term of the contract to which appellant never 
as~cnted, which is not alleged in the complaint and 
\\~hich never entered counsel's mind until they came to 
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appreciate respondent's predicam-ent under a conditional 
acceptance. After Exhibit A was receiv~ed and before 
respondent dispatched Exhibit B, it ·had -already received 
the assurance of the government of. the sale to it of 
the tools held in surplus. MacNaughton, president 
of respondent company testified: 
Q. Now, Mr. MacNaughton, upon the receipt of 
the cablegram from Eimeo Corporation, which 
you have testified you received on or about 
August 8, 1946, you replied 'by cable. I be-
lieve that is the following day, August 9th~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I remember correctly. Now at the tim·e, 
Mr. MacNaughton, you sent that cable which 
says, 'Hawaiian Equipment Company sells 
you', and so forth~ 
A. Y~es. 
Q. Did you own the tools in question here~ 
A.· Yes. 
Q. You had aequired title to them~ 
A. As soon as we made the-· or received the 
cable. from Eimco Corporation saying, set-
ting the price, and saying ''Will take all, 
Honolulu,'' we called the ·Surplus Property 
Office, the man who was in. charge of the 
division of these tools, and told him we were 
buying thos-e tools fro1n hjm at the price set 
by the Government. Ile said, ''All right, they 
, are yours." (Rec. p. 107). 
And yet counsel argue· that it can be implied from 
appellant's so-called offer that the contract was to be 
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conditional on respondent's ability to s·ecure the ·p,rop~erty 
from surplus. 
At page 19 of the brief, counsel n1ake the interest-
ing statement that the words •' subject to delivery from 
surplus'' are immaterial to prevent a binding contract 
because '• Eimco immediately acquir·ed the- goods upon 
receipt of the offer." If respondent knew that to be 
true, and Eimco had already acquired the goods, why 
qualify an absolute sale (if there was a sale) by saying 
it would only be a sale if respondent secured delivery 
from surplus? 
We again refer to the authorities quoted by us in 
our first brief upon the question of conditional accept-
ance. If they do not apply to this case, then there is 
no state of facts to which such rule could ap:p,ly. 
Counsel are so hard pressed on this matter of con-
ditional acceptance that they must even rely upon a 
remark of counsel for appellant at the trial when m·oving 
for a directed verdict. They quote and italicize: 
''Conceding that said tw~o cables constitut.ed 
an offer ancl accept{J)'YICe to buy and sell, they did 
no't result in a valid contract because there was 
no meeting of minds." (Respondent's Brief, p. 
25). 
Of course, this 'vas only a concession for the sake of 
the alternative ground of the motion. It is idle to regard 
it as an admission that there was an offer and accept-
ance. 
Counsel complain that the points argued by appel-
lant that Exhibit B was a conditional acceptance and 
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that "f.o.b." in Exhibit C imports a new term not re-
sponsive to Exhibit A, are raised for the first time on 
appeal (Brief p. 18-21). They also remark that appellant 
"has brought forth some new ideas on appeal such as 
the assertion that the acceptance was conditional be-
cause 'it imported an entirely new tenn in the bargain 
contrary to what was intended by def·endant. '' (Brief 
p. 23). 
If appellant was late in discovering these defects in 
th~ so-called acceptance, we may assume that respondent 
was equally at fault; otherwis·e, with their usual candor, 
they would long ago have confessed that no case could 
be successfully maintained on such a state of facts. How-
ever, we give them credit for saying all that can he said 
in justification of a verdict, in support of which nothing 
can be said. They argue that "f.o.b." in Exhibit B is 
not a new term; that the term is well understood in 
trade and ''meant that plaintiff would deliver the goods 
sold at Honolulu on board a vessel without charge to 
Eimco." (Br. p. 21). But is anything said in Exhibit 
A about "f.o.b." ~ Who was to designate the vess·el? 
Had respondent the right to deliver the goods on any 
vessel of its own selection~ Can the additional "f.o.b., 
provision also be implied when appellant by Exhibit A 
says nothing n1ore than ''Honolulu''~ l\fay 've not pre-
sume that 'appellant desired to determine for itself by 
what· line, when, upon what terms and under what in-
surance the merchandise would he shipped to the main-
land~ How can it be said that·" f.o.b~" does not import 
a new term into the con~ract, just as ''subject delivery 
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from surplus'' is a new term 1 
Taking the exhibits, A and B, upon which respondent 
1nust rely as the ''contract in writjng'' whereby appel-
lant offered to buy and respondent sold the particular 
property itemized itn the complaJint, no other conclusion 
is possible but that Exhibit A is so uncertain and in-
complete as to be worthless as a ''memorandum'' under 
the statute, but if by any sort of reasoning, however 
unsound, it ran be regarded as an ''offer", nevertheless 
Exhibit B constituted no acceptance and, therefore, no 
con tract ever ""'"as created. 
the 
In conclusion, counsel requests the court to apply 
'·Fundamental judicial principle that where 
the evidence considered as a whole manifests an 
intention of the parties to arrive at a bargain, a 
construction will be given to the transaction, if 
possibhe, which will- establish a vali<;l contract 
rather than defeat one." (Br. p. 32) (Italics ours). 
Of course, there was some intention of the parties 
to do some kind of business with each other, else Ex-
hibits A and B 'vould never have been sent. Ap-
pellant contends that it intended Exhibit A as 
a~ authorization for respondent to bid. R-espondent 
says that Exhibit A meant "offer to buy." Respondent 
asks for the adoption of its construction based on parol 
evidence which is controverted by appellant. Can such 
an uncertainty in the writing be cured by parol' Appel-
lant further contends that Exhibit A designates no prop-
erty then identifi·ed or known to either party, or capable 
of being definitely ascertained, and the proof shows 
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that even respondent did not consider the property defi-
nitely ascertained until w·eeks after Exhibit A was re-
ceived, that is to say, after the property had been un-
packed in the Salt Lake area at Honolulu. Especially is 
it true· that Exhibit A could not possibly be considered 
as identifYing the particular property listed in the com-
plaint and which is there described in such detail. The 
exhibit as a whole is not a sufficient memor01Yitdum of the 
contract.- signed by the party to be charged, embodying 
with certainty· ·all the necessary terms of the contract. 
Exhibit B is certainly insufficient as an acceptance, 
even if Exhlbit A was an offer, which it was not. Exhibit 
B is conditional and imports new terms not suggested or 
in1plied by Exhibit A. Therefore, even applying the 
''fundamental judicial principles,'' it is not possible to 
make a contract out of the transaction between appellant 
and respondent in this case. 
We respectfully submit that- the judgment should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WII_.~LIS ,V. RITTER 
JESSE R. S. BUDGE 
Attor-neys for Defendant 
and A1Jpellant 
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